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 This research has been conducted in the Brazil’s Northeast region, economically the 
weakest region in the country. A total of 35 business incubators (97%) and 93 firms 
(29%) were surveyed by questionnaire and interviews were conducted in 14 incubators 
in order to map the region’s incubators and to evaluate the practice and the possible 
impact of this economic development tool. 
 In our analysis we found evidence of structural and administrative failures, absence 
of adequate business development and financial instability due to a low level of public 
investment. Since there is no clear policy, each incubator is an independent initiative of 
either a public or private university, a technology park, a science department of local 
government or a non-profit organization.  
 The lack of adequate finance has as a consequence the prevalence of software firms 
on the expense of other innovative sectors and the abundance of part-time incubator and 
firm personnel and, more importantly, it also brings about part-time entrepreneurs. 
 Apart of a relatively small fraction of strong and effective incubators, the majority of 
the surveyed incubators performs an incorrect firm selection process, does not define a 
fixed period for firms graduating from the incubator and in general provides the firm 
with facilities but not with consistent consulting on most of the relevant areas of 
business development. 
 The dissertation concludes that this economic development tool can be put to greater 
advantage of the region, if given policy and managerial changes are introduced in the 
near future. 







 Esta pesquisa foi realizada no Nordeste do Brasil, a região mais pobre do país. 35 
incubadoras de empresas (97%) e 93 empresas incubadas (29%) responderam 
questionários e foram realizadas entrevistas em 14 incubadoras, a fim de mapear as 
incubadoras da região e avaliar a prática e o possível impacto desse instrumento de 
desenvolvimento económico. 
 O nosso estudo é inspirado na política de incubadora tecnológica pública israelita. 
Um programa do governo com 22 anos de operação, que utiliza um modelo de 
incubadoras privadas com amplo investimento público. O caso de Israel fornece um 
ponto de referência que pode ajudar a comparar e compreender melhor o potencial da 
incubadora no nordeste do Brasil na sua forma actual. 
 Na nossa análise encontramos evidências de falhas estruturais e administrativos, 
ausência de comportamento empresarial e instabilidade financeira devido a um baixo 
nível de investimento público. Como não existe uma política clara na região, cada 
incubadora é uma iniciativa independente de um instituto de ensino público ou privado, 
um parque tecnológico, departamento de ciência do governo local ou outra organização 
sem fins lucrativos. 
 A falta de recursos financeiros traz a prevalência de empresas do sector informático 
em detrimento de outros sectores inovadores e a abundância de funcionários em tempo 
parcial nas incubadoras e nas firmas e o mais importante, o empreendedorismo a tempo 
parcial. 
 Além de uma parte relativamente pequena de incubadoras fortes e eficazes, a maioria 
realiza um processo incorrecto de selecção de empresa, não define período fixo para a 
incubação e em geral, fornece as empresas com instalações, mas falta uma consultoria 
consistente e intervenção pró-activa. 
Palavras-chave: Nordeste do Brasil, Incubadoras de Empresas, Empreendedorismo, 
Israel, benchmarking, avaliação 
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 Business incubators in Brazil may have a great role in promoting innovative 
entrepreneurship, strengthening the link between academia and industry and reducing 
economic and cultural barriers. These barriers are being felt stronger in the northeast 
which is economically the most vulnerable region in the country. In Brazil in general 
and particularly in the northeast region, entrepreneurial culture is underdeveloped; some 
cultural characteristics are the acceptance of unequal social order, risk aversion, lack of 
competitiveness and assertiveness and the relative tendency towards collectivism
 
(Monteiro da Silva, Gomes, & Correia, 2009).  
 Technological entrepreneurship in the region have difficulties to raise funds, 
entrepreneurs lack networking and are inexperienced. An incubator is a tool intended to 
overcome these shortcomings. By assisting the firm to approach financial resources and 
giving it a supportive environment, the incubator may increase the start-up’s chances to 
survive the seed stage.  
 This study maps 35 technological, traditional and mixed incubators in the region, an 
extensive surveyed was conducted. By using a comprehensive database with 
information for all the existing incubators together with 29% of a total of 320 incubated 
firms and by conducting interviews with 14 incubator managers, we intend to describe 
how each function of the incubation process is being implemented. 
 This paper uses the Israeli technology incubator program (“the Israeli model”) as a 
benchmark. This program has operated in Israel for the last 22 years in which it 
maintained constancy and stability thanks to uniform and solid science and technology 
policies by the different state governments. After about 10 years of operation the 
program transformed from a preliminary model of nonprofit organizations to a model 
which uses a powerful market mechanism by establishing partnerships between the 
incubators and the firms and therefore increases the motivation of the former to take an 
active part in the latter’s management.  
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 Through the use of statistical analysis and a comparison with the Israeli model when 
it is relevant, we will evaluate the characteristics and the difficulties of entrepreneurship 
in the northeastern incubators with the purpose to find out which changes should be 
made in order to better realize the potential of this instrument in the region. 
 
2. Framework 
2.1. Definition of Business Incubator 
 Hackett and Dilts (2004) define a business incubator as “a shared office space facility 
that seeks to provide firms with a strategic, value-adding intervention system of 
monitoring and business assistance.”
 
(Hackett & Dilts, 2004a) However, it is not the 
incubator facility, but the incubation process itself which defines incubator’s impact  
(Vanderstraeten & Matthyssens, 2004). 
 A big share of incubation programs are related to Technology Based Companies 
(TBCs). Typically, new TBCs generate products, processes or services as a result of 
applied research. According to Martinez (2003) there are three main motives for high 
mortality among TBCs: 1. Difficulties in transforming a useful technology into a 
successful firm, 2. Lack of managerial knowledge and experience by the entrepreneurs 
and, 3. Lack of financial resources (Martinez, 2003). In addition, it is simply natural that 
innovative firms will have low survival rates since most of the ideas will not become 
viable and profitable eventually. 
 The transformation of a technology (an invention) into a product (innovation) 
requires capabilities which many entrepreneurs are unfamiliar with, such as, planning, 
designing, pricing, marketing, budget control and more. The cost, in time and resources, 
of inefficient management can be destructive for the new company. TBCs are 
characterized by high sunk costs as the R&D phase may take years of work and 
investment before seeing any revenues and even before the firm is capable to raise any 
private investments. Moreover, since technologies have shorter life cycle and the global 
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economy brings on a more competitive environment than ever before, every start-up 
initiative becomes more risky.  
 Some incubators may deal with more traditional firms, particularly in developing 
regions where these firms, despite possibly having less original and risky ideas, may 
encounter similar difficulties due to lack of entrepreneurship culture, networking and 
other barriers arising from the underdevelopment of the region. 
 While large and medium-sized enterprises benefit from their structure, bargaining 
power, the flow of information between its different units and other factors related to 
economies of scale, small and micro enterprises struggle to survive on their own in a 
competitive and dynamic environment (Raupp & Beuren, 2007). For these smaller 
enterprises, a failure is a common scenario and when the firm is condemned to fail it 
should at least fail quickly, while manage to cut losses and leverage some of the added 
value it already managed to develop. 
Most important, as a result of the barriers described here, innovative firms in their 
seed or pre-seed stages are failing to raise private investments in their local business 
environment (Khalil & Olafsen, 2009-2010). The uncertainty regarding innovation in 
products and services combining with the high sank costs and long R&D phase scare 
away private investors which prefer more solid investments.  
The difficulties in fundraising bring governments to conduct development promoting 
policies and to allocate resources for that purpose. Yet transferring public funds to 
private entrepreneurs requires supervision and control systems in order to verify that the 
implementation of these resources will be efficient and effective. In many cases, a 
business/technology incubator is an institution created for that purpose. 
However, funding or providing incubation services should not aim at supporting the 
firm until it becomes profitable, the purpose is to help it go over the seed stage, prove 





Figure 1 –Business Incubator and the Market Failure of TBC
 
Source: Own elaboration, inspired on the ideas put forward in Serra, Serra, Ferreira, & Fiates, 2010. 
 Therefore, incubators’ purpose is to help firms to overcome possible market failure.
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Thanks to economy of scale, the incubator may provide services in reduced prices, such 
as: facilities, business consulting, legal services, accounting, maintenance, cleaning, etc.  
 A critical resource that the incubator provides is managerial experience, which new 
entrepreneurs usually do not have and therefore quicker solutions for problems. By 
holding an experienced team of managers and advisors, it reduces the learning cost by 
shortening of the learning curve (Smilor, 1987). Therefore the incubator reduces the initial 
risk and speeds up business development. It may also help the firm to fail quicker and 
with reduced losses. Incubators that perform this function are successful incubators, 
because quick and cheap failures provide opportunities for entrepreneurial learning, 
firm recovery, repositioning and optimal allocation of incubators’ and firms’ resources 
(Hackett & Dilts, 2004a). In addition, the incubator provides Networking, the importance 
of sharing learning practices and the exchange of information and ideas. First, Business 
                                                          
1
 A market failure may arise in the sense that potential social benefits are higher than the social costs. 
5 
 
incubators do not act in solitude; these entities develop partnerships with several other 
organizations, such as government, municipalities, for profit or non-profit entities, 
development and financial agencies (Vanderstraeten & Matthyssens, 2004), as well as access 
to suppliers, potential partners, investors, clients and more. Second, an incubator may 
stimulate networking among its incubated firms, while those who maintain contact with 
other incubators or make part of a regional or national group may benefit from 
spillovers and information, thus providing their incubated firms with tips and solutions 
to problems as well as potential partnerships across the region/country. 
 Regarding the difficulties in fundraising, there are national or regional incubation 
programs in which incubated firms receive significant public funds in order to develop 
the business up to the point when market fundraising is possible. In other cases the 
incubator may intermediate between the firms and Development Finance Institutions 
(DFIs) or private investors (angels or venture capitalists).  
 A business incubator may have a significant impact on entrepreneurial culture (Khalil 
& Olafsen, 2009-2010). By developing associative and shared actions, by creating success 
stories and spreading them among other firms and incubators, it provides potential 
entrepreneurs with the faith and the desire to succeed (Raupp & Beuren, 2007). 
 
 The universal goal of an incubator is to increase the chances of a firm to survive 
its formative years, and to provide ‘hands-on support’ but not ‘life support’, in other 
words, the incubator should aim to move the firm to a point where it is no longer 
dependent on the incubator services or on public support (Harman & Read, 2003). 
 However, incubators play various roles and have different goals according to the 
region where they are working and the interest of their shareholders. Hence, while for 
an academic incubator its main goals will be the commercialization of university 
innovations, for a traditional incubator established to develop the local economy its 




2.2. Incubator Model 
 The main distinguishing components of incubator models are Selection, business 
support, mediation, graduation and, probably the most important component, 
financing: 
 Selection – Begins in promoting the incubator activities in order to increase demand 
for the service. When such a demand exists, the decision concerning which ventures to 
accept for entry and which to reject should be made by experts and talents scouts in the 
specific field. A good selection will mark the quality of the incubation process.  
 Hackett and Dilts (2004) suggest that, in order to accurately respond the market 
failure from an economic rationality perspective it is important to differentiate the types 
of applicants in the following criteria: (a) cannot be helped through business incubation 
(sometimes due to the incubator’s inability to assist) (b) should be incubated due to the 
existence of some resources gaps and (c) may develop without incubation 
 
(Hackett & 
Dilts, 2004a).  
 Bergek and Norrman (2007) distinguish between two kinds of selection: selection 
focused primarily on the idea and selection focused primarily on the entrepreneur 
considering her seriousness and business culture. Other two basic approaches are strict 
or flexible selection. In the more rigid “picking-the-winners” approach, the incubator 
managers try to identify a few potentially successful ventures ex ante. In the “survival-
of-the-fittest” approach incubator managers apply less rigid selection criteria, accept a 
larger number of firms into the incubation process and allow the strong ones to survive 
while the others will fade away. The decision of which approach to adopt stems 
primarily from the demand faces by the incubator, while a successful incubator, 
attracting many potential incubates, would naturally adopt a “picking-the-winners” 
approach. However it will also be sharply dependent on the incubator’s budget and the 
risk its shareholders are willing to take. 
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 Business Support – Bergek and Norrman (2007) distinguish between different types 
of support mainly based on the intervention level of the incubator: (1) Reactive and 
episodic counseling, which is entrepreneur-initiated – the entrepreneur requests help 
dealing with a crisis or problem according to its own will and its needs. (2) Proactive 
and episodic counseling, which is incubator-initiated – the incubator engages 
entrepreneurs in informal counseling periodically but not intensively. (3) Continual and 
proactive counseling, which is incubator-initiated – the venture is subjected to an 
ongoing review and “intense-aggressive” intervention by incubator managers (Bergek & 
Norrman, 2007). The characteristics of business support are normally related to the nature 
of the financial relationship between the incubator and the firms. If the firm receives 
funds (from a third party) through the incubator or, when the incubator itself invests in 
exchange of shares of the incubated firm, the intervention becomes more intense. In that 
sense the incubator may serve as an instrument for the optimization of public 
investments in private TBC. Hackett and Dilts (2004) claim that the more the incubator 
behaves as a venture capitalist and the more financial interest it has in its firms, the 
more intense its business support is and better incubator performance can be expected 
(Hackett & Dilts, 2004b). 
 
 Mediation – The incubator mediates between its incubated firms and creates 
networking with other incubators; therefore it may provide knowledge spill-overs in 
different scales, using different tools as intranet, journals, shared events etc. The 
incubated firms may also enjoy a better access to suppliers, potential clients, investors, 
partners and other agents or institutions which provide them with solutions (professors, 
experts, trainees, volunteers, research institutions, labs and more). 
 The incubators may also engage in institutional mediation, i.e. mediating the impacts 
of institutions on firms (Hackett and Dilts, 2004b). Through mediation, incubators may help 
8 
 
incubated firms to understand, interpret and perhaps even influence the institutional 
demands introduced by regulations, laws, traditions, values, norms and cognitive rules. 
 
 Graduation – The duration of the incubation period should be well defined by a 
program, a policy or an incubation plan but sometimes it remains flexible and changes 
according to the firm maturity and ability to graduate after being a given period in the 
incubator. In the absence of a specified duration, a situation of a constant negotiation is 
being created; the firm may not be ready to graduate or may prefer to stay incubated 
despite being ready, as it enjoys the incubator’s shelter and its financial benefits (low 
cost services etc.). The incubator may as well prefer the stability resulting from keeping 
the incubated firms, however, in many cases, from an economic rationality perspective, 
it is necessary to clear space for the entrance of new incubates, as the purpose of the 
incubator is to allow the establishment of new firms. More important, from the firm’s 
point of view, it is essential to define incubation time constraints in order to stimulate 
entrepreneurs’ productivity and efficiency by making it clear that time is limited and the 
work must be done quickly enough. In addition, when a firm is mature it is necessary to 
make the decision to move out, against the short-term financial incentives, since 
“leaving the nest” will confront the firm with new challenges and as a result may 
increase its productivity in the medium-long run (Corinne , Adkins , Wolfe , & LaPan, 2010).  
 In many cases the incubator is strongly connected to a technological park (may be a 
part of it) and the graduation will be much more convenient, as well as, in accordance 
with the incubator interest of building and enhancing the technological park. 
 According to the National Business Incubation Association (NBIA), average 





2.3. The Israeli Model and the financing of the incubator and its incubated firms  
 Apart of the incubator budget and its funding sources, it is important to define the 
degree to which incubators may assist incubates with financial matters (Hackett & Dilts, 
2004b). Most incubators do not maintain their own investment fund, serving instead as a 
broker that introduces incubates to private or public sources of capital. The investment 
should be well defined as a part of a governmental program (as in Israel), otherwise 
funds could be scarcer, coming from different sources whenever it is possible to raise 
them (as in Brazil). 
  
 The Israeli public technological incubator program (PTIP) was established in 1991 in 
order to foster high-tech environment and provide opportunities for TBCs. At that time 
a large immigration from the Soviet Union had begun (more than one million people in 
ten years into a state populated by about 5 millions), many of the immigrants were 
scientists and engineers (Frenkel, Shefer, & Miller, 2005) who suffered language barriers and 
had an underdeveloped entrepreneurial culture, in the initial years of the PTIP, up to 
50% of incubator’ entrepreneurs were of soviet origin.  
 In the first few years 28 incubators were established in the country, all were 
nonprofit organizations (NPOs), each incubator received up to 175,000$ a year for 
current expenses, additional funding resources were incomes from services provision 
and rent fees, in some cases royalties from graduated firms and donations. 
 The incubated firm would receive 85% of the budget required for the first two years 
(up to 300,000$) while the entrepreneur had to raise the supplement (15%) 
independently. The firm’s ownership was defined as follows: 20% belongs to the 
incubator, at least 50% to the entrepreneurs, 10% to the employees and up to 20% for a 
supplemental investor. 
 It is important to mention that at the same time a public program for venture capital 
(VC) (The Yozma Program) was launched in Israel and had a great impact in 
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establishing a VC market in Israel which eventually provided an important support to 
the PTIP. 
 At the beginning of the 2000s, a “privatization” process had begun and in few years 
all incubators in Israel (today 26) became private for-profit enterprises. The “Israeli 
model” of PTIP is unique and original and it is being studied by many. Today the 
average investment for an incubated project is 500,000$ (2M$ for biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical firms), 85% provided by the states while 15% is invested by the 
incubator who negotiates its share with the entrepreneurs (up to 50%).  
 Entrepreneurs may fully dedicate their time to their firms since they receive generous 
salaries (wage-caps regarding entrepreneurs and employees are well-defined by the 
law).  
 The selection process is extremely rigid, as demand is very high; it begins with the 
entrepreneur being approved by the incubator who submits the request to the Office of 
Chief Scientist (OCS) in the ministry of industry and trade. The OCS appoints an 
evaluator who recommends to a committee. Incubation is for two years and 90% of the 
projects manage to graduate as the clear goal of the PTIP is to bring the project to 
the point where it manage to raise funds from private investors, angels and 
venture capital. 
 The model’s superiority is evidenced by several aspects
2
: it solves the controversial 
problem of incubator’s sustainability (Khalil & Olafsen, 2009-2010); the large public 
investments together with a well-organized business plan ensure that the firm will be 
able to effort the rent and payments for services; the incubator is “playing on the same 
team” with the firm, since they are partners they have many shared goals, in addition the 
incubator does not directly receive public funds and it has to be business driven. 
However the main regulation is being done by the state, the same evaluator from the 
                                                          
2
 The two main critics of the privatization process are: 1. Primary selection by the incubator relies on a 
private profit interest; therefore very risky long-term projects may be left out. 2. For the same reason, the 
PTIP may lose its role as a peripheral development tool. 
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selection phase, constantly supervising the firms and conducts an intense-aggressive 
intervention in project’s management while the incubator provides an administrative 
network. 
 Since all incubators are selected by a tender, each one of them is committed to the 
OCS’ standards; national network for incubators is being managed by the OCS and its 
being used to promote cooperation, partnerships and spillovers. Lastly, a program 
evaluation is relatively easy to conduct, since the information is centralized and 
incubators and firms are committed to provide it. 
 In recent years the total annual budget for the program was around 100M$. In 
accordance to OCS reports the ratio of private investment to public investment in the 
projects is approximately 1 to 6. The PTIP had a great impact on entrepreneurial culture, 
human capital development and in specific sectors as clean-technology and medical 




 This study was carried out in four stages:  
3.1. Pre-study of Israeli incubation program, in order to prepare a process of 
benchmarking  
 This stage included four interviews, two with the Israeli program manager, another 
with an expert who carried out program evaluations and lastly, with a former incubator 
manager who took part in the first years of the program. Moreover, three evaluations 
were revised (Shefer and Frenkel 2002, Shefer, Frenkel and Miller 2005 and Kaufman 





3.2. Pre-studying of incubation in Brazil and the northeast in particular, in order 
to form two appropriate questionnaires 
 This stage included visits to two incubators in the state of Alagoas and five 
interviews with: two incubator managers from the South and Southeast regions and 
three executives from incubators’ networks of the state of Bahia, the Northeast (in 
Fortaleza), and ANPROTEC (the Brazilian Network in Brasilia).  
 After incorporating the information collected with several studies from a variety of 
countries, including the Israeli evaluations, we created two questionnaires, one for 
incubator managers and another for firm managers. The questionnaires aimed to cover 
all aspects of the process: financial, structural, cultural, personnel, as well as the main 
functions: selection, incubation, graduation and networking. 
 Several key points were at stake due to expected limitations: 
 First, there was no access to information regarding graduated firms, most incubators 
do not hold contacts and if they do so, they have no reliable information regarding sales, 
number of workers etc. There were several attempts to receive information about 
graduated firms which was collected by ANPROTEC in an extensive study from 2012, 
regarding Brazilian incubators. However it was claimed that due to a very poor 
cooperation by incubators and firms in the northeast region, they maintain a very 
modest database which eventually we could not receive. 
 Second, there was no place for intrusive questions (sales volume and revenues for 
instance), in order not to discourage the respondents and since firms had no obligation 
to respond. 
 Third, it was important to design some of the firms´ questions so that we may verify 
and confront the incubator´s answers from the firms’ point of view (Hackett & Dilts, 
2004b). 
 Fourth, since we had no access to any official information (Incubators/Firms 
account books) it was necessary to rely, in many cases, on qualitative questions.  
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 Fifth, in some cases we had to repeat questions and ask them in different forms in 
order to verify the answers (it proved to be extremely important).  
 Lastly, the uncertainty regarding the expected volume and quality of the replies, led 
us to prefer a wider questionnaire which covered many issues and by that, made sure we 
find enough evidence to be able to draw strong conclusions. 
 After the questionnaires were ready, we applied them as a pilot, in the incubator 
“Incubal” in Alagoas and four incubated firms, asking for feedbacks. The final versions 
were uploaded to “Google Drive”, each form has about 30 questions. (Appendix 8 and 
9). 
 
3.3. Data collection by application of questionnaires and visits 
 The process of data collection was an enriching experience by itself; it was an 
important introduction to the phenomenon of business incubators in the region. A very 
incomplete list was received from ANPROTEC, who either do not hold full information 
and contacts regarding the incubators in the region or do not share it easily. The 
majority of phone numbers and emails were collected using the internet and by calling 
local agencies such as science departments or local networks. 
 The formation of an updated contact list was made simultaneously with the request 
from incubators to answer a questionnaire and provide us with a list of firms’ contacts. 
This research was not backed up by any official support, neither by the Federal 
University of Alagoas nor by any other institution.  
 While many incubators were motivated to assist and urged their firms to respond, 
others were more discrete and initially refused or lingered to provide us with the 
contacts. The author believes that all publicly financed incubators must have their firms’ 
contact-list available to the public in order to allow observation and to enable the access 
of potential investors, partners and clients. It is important to state here that since 
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incubator managers could often choose the respondents, and as many of them may fear 
criticism, we assume that our sample is not of a completely random nature. 
 During the contacts with incubators and firms, it was noticed that, regarding most 
institutions, the main player, the manager, is often away from the office, giving classes 
or carrying out different tasks as called for by specified duties. Very often it was not 
possible to find any person with authority to provide information. Apart of that, we 
could notice the lack of centralization and control, many incubators are not being 
monitored by the department of science (or any other authority), registrations such as 
manager’s name, phone number and email address are hard to find. 
 However, eventually intensive methods were used, including numerous phone calls 
and mails, almost begging incubators to provide information. Visits were conducted in 
six incubators in Pernambuco, four in Alagoas and four in Ceara, a total of 14 out of 36 
incubators in the region (39%). These visits were used in order to extent the research; 
confront managers with some of the preliminary conclusions and also to increase the 
number of participants. 
 Ultimately, 35 out of 36 incubators (a new incubator from Bahia state refused to 
participate) and 93 out of 320 firms replied to the questionnaires (in practice 
questionnaires were sent to about 220 firms), a very satisfying result. We believe that 
the fact that the contacts were made by a foreigner who presented the name of a 
Portuguese university, displaying the image of an international research, may have been 
relevant to encourage cooperation. That is due to the common belief that generally in 
Brazil and particularly in the northeastern region, there is a tendency to overstate the 
value and importance of foreign work.  
 Despite the lack of order and organization, it is very important to mention that the 
large number of answers was achieved due to a significant good will by the Brazilian 
agents. It is doubtful, that applying the same modest methods without the help of any 
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authority could have led to similar results in different regions with different cultures 
around the world. 
 
3.4. Data analysis 
 Our database is divided into two groups, 35 incubators which represents the whole 
population (36 in the region) while 93 firms are a sample of 29% out of 320 firms in the 
region. The size of that sample is outstanding, it allows us to evaluate the region’s 
incubation more accurately and since not all the information collected was used in this 
paper, it leaves an open door for future researches. 
Distribution of our sample by states is presented in Table 1: 
Table 1 – Distribution of firms by States 
 
Total % of Total Responds % of Sample 
Alagoas 60 18.8% 14 15.0% 
Bahia 25 7.8% 10 10.8% 
Ceara 81 25.3% 23 24.7% 
Maranhão 6 1.9% 2 2.2% 
Paraíba 18 5.6% 7 7.5% 
Pernambuco 56 17.5% 19 20.4% 
Rio Grande do Norte 58 18.1% 13 14.0% 
Sergipe 16 5.0% 5 5.4% 
Total 320 100.0% 93 100.0% 
 
 During the data collection an effort was made to compare the sample with the actual 
distribution of firms in the region. Some deficiencies are recorded in Alagoas and Rio 
Grande do Norte (3.7% and 4.2%) while Bahia, Pernambuco and Paraíba are in excess 
(3.0%, 2.9% and 1.9%).  
 Another important point is the distribution of our sample by sectors in comparison 
with the actual population according to incubator’s reports. As seen in Graph 1, the 
sample mainly differs by including 3% more biotechnological-chemicals firms and 5% 





Graph 1 – Sample (n=93) 
 
 The 93 firms of our sample came from 27 incubators and do not distribute equally or 
proportionally with the actual number of firms in every incubator but were collected 
randomly, that distribution is available in appendix 1.  
 
 The guiding principle for our analysis was to keep the use of simple statistical tools 
(mainly descriptive). The reason is that the data is non-parametric, was not randomly 
collected and is not normally distributed. Apart of descriptive statistics, there is an 
extensive use of Spearman’s correlation coefficient. We have applied various local tests 
for non-parametric statistics such as Mann–Whitney U test for two independent groups 
in order to compare between answers to the same question given by different agents and 
Friedman’s two-way analysis of variance, a test used in order to compare n questions 
answered by related groups. Due to the modest size of our samples and the character of 
the answers we opted to consider a significance level of 0.10 as acceptable (all p-values 
are two-tailed). Tests Reports appear in the appendices. 
 Many questions were qualitative and in order to compare distributions and conduct 
location tests we had to transform nominal variables into ordinal by using common 
sense. In many cases this transformation was problematic and had to be performed 
intuitively since variables were ordinal by nature but not cardinal. An example is the 
2% 
















adjustment of variables describing the employment of different professionals in the 
incubator (Full-time, Part-time, Outsourcing and None) into an ordinal variable which 
represents ranks (3, 2, 1 and 0 points respectively) assuming that, for our purpose, part-
time for example would be worth twice as outsourcing but two thirds of full-time. Most 
cases are explained in detail during the result analysis. 
 The results are divided into ten groups: Taxonomy/Typology, Goals and Impacts, 
Self-Sustainability and Budget, Sectors of Activity, Investment Volume, Entrepreneurs 
and Personnel, Incubators response to the firms’ needs, Selection Process, Intervention 
level and last but not least, Graduation. In many cases answers by both incubators and 
firms are presented simultaneously in order to show the different perceptions and the 




 35 Business incubators participated in the study, only three of them were private, of 
which none seems to have a strong impact. One private incubator has no firms at the 
moment and is searching for a new model since the last one has failed. The other two 
are for-profit incubators which belong to private universities, yet they are recent (less 
than 10 years) and have very few firms.  
Graph 2 – Incubators Ownership and Type (n=35) 
 








Ownership and Type  (n=35) 
 Technology Mixed Traditional-Agro
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 We will mainly focus on the differences between incubators of Non-Profit 
Organizations (NPOs) and Public-Universities (PUS) (Federal and State-owned) as well 
as the distinction between Technology, Mixed and Agro-Traditional Incubators. 
 17 incubators of NPOs are often located next to universities (public or private), they 
may be part of a university, technology parks or other technology institution. In few 
cases these incubators are cooperatives or departments in a Development Finance 
Institution (DFI
3
). We may observe in graph 2 that NPOs are slightly more focused on 
technology.
4
 The other 15 incubators are in practice, departments of PUs, most of them 
lack financial autonomy and usually suffer some limitations, due to the university’s 
character. PUs in the region tend to be distant from cities centers, settled in rural areas 
and in many cases are characterized by a lack of entrepreneurship-oriented culture. As 
we will see in the next sections, firms in public incubators enjoy higher investments and 
better access to laboratories and these incubators have personnel of higher education 
level. However incubators from NPOs have better management they are more business 
driven and are more sustainable, most important, they present better results. The 6 
incubators with the highest number of graduated firms in the last 5 years are all NPOs. 
 
Graph 3 - Type of Incubator by State (n=36) 
 
  
                                                          
3
 SEBRAE, FINEP, FAPS, CNPq. 
4
 Technology-based business incubators engaged in the development of firms related to technologies such 
as software and hardware, biotech, chemicals, clean-tech and new materials. (Vanderstraeten J. and 
Matthyssens P., 2012). 


































Source: Brazilian Institution 




 Graph 3 shows the distribution of incubators by states, we may observe that although 
the Bahia has the biggest population in the region, Pernambuco and Ceara are leading in 
incubation activity (also in terms of firms). They are followed by Rio Grande do Norte 
and Alagoas. Maranhão has one business incubator (two firms only), the same as 
Paraiba which has one of the strongest incubators in the region (as a part of technology 
park Campina Grande).  
Graph 4 – Type of Incubators by Age (n=35) 
 
 In Graph 4 we may observe that 20 out of 35 incubators were set up in the last 10 
years, all three private institutions, 10 PUs initiatives and seven NPOs. All six 
traditional-agro incubators were established between 2002 and 2005. That tendency 
may be explained by the green book (Brasilia, 2000) and the white book (Brasilia, 
2002) of the ministry of science and technology which preceded the important law of 
innovation (Dec, 2004). 
 27 incubators provide the incubated firms with facilities, six (one of technology, 
three mixed and two traditional) provide facilities only to part of the firms while 
outsourcing the rest. Two traditional-agro incubators do not provide facilities at all. We 
may state that traditional incubators focus more on consulting and networking without 
physical incubation and in many cases traditional or mixed incubators receive firms 
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4.2. Goals and Impacts 
 Incubators managers were asked to rate on a Likert scale of 1 to 5, five different 
goals which appear on table 5 and their estimations for Impact (impacts) in accordance 
with the first four goals, the scores are presented in the table: 
Table 5 – Evaluation of Goals and Estimated Impacts 
 Goal Impact 
1. Job creation, promotion of development and social inclusion 4.46 3.43 
2. Commercialization of university’s knowledge 4.18 2.89 
3. Promotion of human capital 4.34 3.51 
4. Development of entrepreneurial culture 4.83 3.83 
5. Generate profit for the incubator 2.77  
 Using a Friedman test, no significant differences were found between the first three 
goals. However, Goal-Culture was significantly higher (p=0.039) while Goal-Profit 
was much lower (p=0.000). Regarding the impacts, managers’ estimations showed that 
commercialization of university’s knowledge (Impact-Knowledge) is significantly lower 
(p-value=0.079) while development of entrepreneurial culture (Impact-Culture) is 
significantly higher. (p-value=0.05) We may draw some conclusions: 
 First, the focus of incubator managers on development of entrepreneurial culture 
indicates that in their vision, that kind of culture in the region is weak and need to be 
reinforced. Our interviews draw a character of an entrepreneur who sees investment as a 
cost, prefers not to work with external investors and is opposed to partnerships. Seems 
that many entrepreneurs lack ambition, trust in others and faith in their business.  
 However the development of such a culture is hard to measure, particularly in 
comparison with the first two goals; it is much less concrete and is a long-term goal, we 
believe that defining it as the main goal and impact is somehow a compromise with the 
abstract results of the region’s incubators. Moreover, referring to the Israeli experience a 
development of strong entrepreneurial culture may be performed, not only but mainly 
by producing success stories and role model firms, and that is what incubators should 
focus on doing.  
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 It is interesting to find that there is a strong negative and exclusive correlation 
between Goal-Culture and Investment average (during the first two years) per project as 
estimated by each incubator (investment is not correlated with any other goal or 
impact), (rs= - 0.555, p=0.014). Although only 19 incubators gave their estimation for 
investment average, this strong correlation may imply that when an incubator is 
inhabited mainly by poor projects, naturally, its goals become less ambitious and less 
focused and vice-versa, when goals are abstract the investments are low. 
 Second, there is an obvious lack of market mechanism in incubators behavior. Only 
eight incubators ranked 4 or 5 (four of each) regarding profit making as a goal (only one 
belong to a PU). The fact that incubators in the region have no orientation towards 
profitability may affect their ability to develop such an orientation among entrepreneurs 
and as we will see in the next sections, it is one of the main points where transformation 
of the entrepreneurial-culture is required.  
 Lastly, although most incubators are either a department of an institution for higher 
education or strongly subjected to one, commercialization of university’s knowledge 
seems to be a less important goal and much less of an impact, however the reason for 
that may be the prevalence of traditional business activity among incubators in the 
region, this kind of activity is less related to academic knowledge. It is important to note 
that an obstacle in the regional academic culture is apparent in the form of a negative 
perception regarding the flow of professors from the academy to the business world. 
This perception is originated in the conflict between the academy and the military 
dictatorship, a conflict which has created a strong Marxist orientation in Brazilian 
academy. It is therefore not naturally accepted when a professor transforms his 
academic research into his own private profit outside the university walls.  
 Two more interesting correlations were identified. Type is positively correlated with 
Goal-Jobs and negatively correlated with Impact-Knowledge, (rs=0.485, p=0.003 and 
rs= - 0.467, p=0.005, respectively). These correlations are quite intuitive; we may say 
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that as much as an incubator aims to a more traditional and less technological sector, it 
is more focused on job creation and social exclusion and less productive regarding the 
commercializing of academic knowledge.  
 
4.3. Self-Sustainability and Budget 
 Managers were asked to report in what level the incubator is self-sustainable, as well 
as the characteristics of budget management, both according to predefined scales. It is 
important to note here, that since the majority of incubators are, in fact, departments of 
universities, technology parks and other related institutions, most of them do not aspire 
for financial independence. The answers are distributed here: 
Table 3: Self-Sustainability, (Total, Ownership and Age)  










All Incubators 25 2 6 2 0 
% 71.4% 5.7% 17.1% 5.7% 0% 
Non-Profit (17) 9 2 5 1 0 
% 52.9% 11.8% 29.4% 5.9% 0% 
Public Universities (15) 13 0 1 1 0 
% 86.7% 0% 6.7% 6.7% 0% 
Less Than 10 Years of Age (17) 15 0 2 0 0 
% 88.2% 0% 11.8% 0% 0% 
10 Years of Age or More (18) 10 2 4 2 0 
% 55.6% 11.1% 22.2% 11.1% 0% 
 
 While all incubators in Israel are self-sustainable and business driven, only two 
incubators in the region reported to have a balanced account. A Mann-Whitney test 
showed (by transforming the variable sustainability to an interval of 1 to 5) that 
distributions of NPOs and PUs are different (p=0.072). 
 Using the same method, a more significant difference was observed between young 
and old incubators (p=0.038). In addition, a significant positive correlation was found 
between Age and Sustainability (rs=0.305, p=0.075). This finding is natural; with more 
years of operation and experience an incubator may gain more impact, deliver more 
services, perform better and therefore, manage to be more sustainable. 
 Incubator Type (1 – Technology, 2 – Mixed and 3 – Traditional-Agro) is not 
correlated with Sustainability, however, the last seems to be negatively correlated (rs= - 
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0.389, p=0.031) with Technology Share
5
, a variable which was calculated by the ratio of 
software, biotech, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and clean-technology 
firms to the total number of incubated firms. Therefore it can be drawn that incubators 
with higher share of technology firm tend to be less self-sustainable. One explanation 
could be found among government policies which may give priority to technological 
entrepreneurship, as a result, traditional incubators may enjoy less public funds and 
therefore have a greater need to be business driven. Moreover, traditional incubators 
may provide, in some cases, services to mature and profitable firms which were not 
established inside the incubator, it is therefore much viable to charge them for the given 
services.  
Table 4: Budget, (Total, ownership and Age)  : 






Total of Incubators 17 5 7 1 5 
% 48,57% 14,29% 20,00% 2,86% 14,29% 
Non-Profit (17) 5 3 4 1 4 
% 29.4% 17.6% 23.5% 5.9% 23.5% 
Public Universities (15) 11 1 3 0 0 
% 73.3% 6.7% 20% 0% 0% 
Less Than 10 Years of Age (17) 8 4 3 0 2 
% 47.1% 23.5% 17.6% 0% 11.8% 
10 Years of Age or More (18) 9 1 4 1 3 
% 50% 5.6% 22.2% 5.6% 16.7% 
* The incubator has an annual or semi-annual budget 
 More than half the incubators do not plan their budget at all, only six reported to 
have a reasonable budget management, none of them belong to a PU. 
 Using a Mann–Whitney test for the variable Budget, we found that distributions of 
the groups NPOs and PUs slightly differed (P=0.10). Moreover, Ownership (1-Private, 
2-NPO and 3-PU) and Budget are negatively correlated. (rs= - 0.417, p=0.013). We may 
conclude that the higher is the private share of an incubator, it is more likely that it will 
manage and keep an independent budget.  
 The differences between old and young incubators regarding budget management are 
insignificant. On one hand older incubators tend to approach profitability and therefore 
                                                          
5
 Technology Share is also strongly and negatively correlated with Type (rs= - 0.569, p=0.001 two-tailed), 
what indicates a good classification of incubators type (for small values higher is the ratio). 
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are more sustainable which is an encouraging sign, but on the other hand it is alarming 
that even veteran incubators do not plan and keep their own budget. 
 As we have seen, most of incubation activity is far from being self-financed. Graph 5 
shows how incubators are financed, (with no reference to direct investments in 
incubated firms). 
Graph 5 - Distribution of Financing Sources (n=33) 
 
*Development Finance Institutions (SEBRAE, FINEP, CNPq and others) 
 There are many different patterns of incubators funding in the region. While their 
infrastructures are usually belong to the institution who maintains the incubator 
(public/private university, technology park etc.), some public incubators receive funds 
for operating activities from DFIs and directly from the state, apart from university 
budget which is usually more permanent. On the other hand, NPO incubators are funded 
mainly by DFIs, private universities and by technological parks, but at least six of them 
receive federal and state funds as well. 
 The most common general patterns for financing variable costs are grants and 
scholarships. These are given by DFIs as SEBRAE, FINEP, CNPq (mostly federal 
funds) and in recent years a notable support is provided by the different FAPS 
(Research Support Foundations), particularly in Alagoas, Bahia and Ceará. These grants 
are not fixed and as a result an incubator which may have received funding from a 
certain institution during few years may suddenly lose that source due to changes in 













support incubators in the region until 2012; many incubators are now struggling to fill 
that void.  
 The impression is that, although fixed costs (infrastructure and permanent personnel) 
are usually granted; most incubators are constantly thirsty for financial resources. Since 
there are neither clear government policy, nor fixed full and defined financial plan, 
incubators managers often have to search for financial solutions and change their plans 
and strategies according to frequently changing nominations and decisions made by 
policy makers and university deans/presidents. Beyond the unnecessary preoccupation 
with politics, forced on the incubator, every financial shock affects the management and 
leads to instability and uncertainty, two negative factors which their prevention is, 
paradoxically, a major part of incubators essence. 
 
4.4. Sectors of Activity 
 Graph 6 presents the distribution by sectors of 320 incubator firms in northeast 
Brazil, the data is based on 31 out of 35 incubators reports. As we observe here, 
incubation in the region is highly focused on software and telecommunications, in fact, 
the majority of the firms (36%) are software producers. However, R&D intensive 
sectors, which require high investments and certain types of networks (Frenkel & Shefer, 
2008), such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and clean-technology 
(Kaufmann, 2009), comprise only 11% of total incubator firms.  


























 The prevalence of traditional sectors as agriculture, food and others is reasonable for 
a developing region where there is a need to improve firm´s organizational capabilities. 
(Etzkowitz, Carvalho de Mello, & Almeida, 2005)  However, the prevalence of software and 
telecommunication firms on the expense of other technological sectors seems to be 
excessive, particularly compared to Israel, where at the beginning of the 1990’s the 
equivalent share was only 12% out of total incubator firms (only 4% software) 
(Kaufmann, 2009). 
 The explanation for that may be found by software firms’ tendency to require much 
less initial investments in comparison with life sciences and other technologies, in 
contrast with the low availability of funds for investments. As will be shown in the next 
section, investment in incubated firms in the region is quite poor, and unstable. 
 
4.5. Investment Volume 
 Firm owners were asked to report the total investment in the first two years of the 
project (for comparison purpose with our benchmark) while incubators managers were 
asked to estimate the average of such an investment in their incubated firms.  
 However, it is important to note here that answers to this question may be 
misleading; first, estimation of firm’s initial investment by incubators may be difficult 
since it varies drastically between the firms. Second, due to bureaucracy or uncertainty 
regarding the product or service to develop, a firm could go few years from its 
establishment until it starts, in fact, to receive investments. Lastly, it seemed that for 
some firms, accounting management is incomplete and expenditures were not orderly 
registered or the report was simply not accurate. 
 Only 19 of 35 incubators gave their estimation along with 82 firms. As expected this 
data is characterized by a particularly high dispersion, yet, we may be able to draw 




Table 6 - Investment (values in BRL) 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Median 
As Reported by Incubators* 278,947.37 19 383,117.98 120,000 
As Reported by Firms 204,462.51 85 522,013.77 50,000 
NPOs 194,765.47 51 598,046.54 30,000 
Public Universities 204,508.56 32 380,039.09 69,000 
No Public Funds 74,804.54 55 193,851.30 20,000 
Public Funds 473,037.96 28 812,874.86 175,000 
Technology Firm 443,273.91 23 911,465.95 70,000 
Software Firm 152,737.23 40 262,332.64 60,000 
Non-Technology Firm 85,848.87 23 522,013,77 5,500 
Source: data collected from firms (except *) 
 Location parameters of Investment differ significantly between incubators and firms 
reports according to a Mann-Whitney test (p=0.011). Either incubator managers are 
overestimating, giving a greater weight to high investment firms or entrepreneurs tend 
to underreport, being modest or discreet regarding their resources. We may accept as 
well, that estimates tend to err and conclude, by using the median (since data is 
dispersed and skewed), that investment for the first two years of incubation in the region 
is between 50,000 to 120,000 reals. As we have seen in previous sections it is about 
10% the Israeli investment in incubator firms (not include Israeli biotech firms who 
receive much more). 
 According to firms’ answers, firms in NPOs have lower investments (a median of 
30,000 reals) compared to these in PUs incubators (a median of 69,000 reals). A Mann-
Whitney test confirmed a significant difference (p=0.093). However no significant 
correlation was found between Investment and Incubator Ownership and differences 
between these two groups of incubators were recorded only by firms’ reports while 
means and medians reported by 19 incubators were quite similar. 
  The extent to which initial Investment is dependent on Public Funds can be learned 
by using another Mann Whitney test, which shows a significant difference between 28 
firms who received grants and 55 of firms who have other sources for funding. 
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(p=0.000). In addition, Investment is strongly correlated with Grants, a variable which 
represents the share of public grants as a percentage of total investment (rs=0.552, 
p=0.000). Investment is also significantly correlated with the share of R&D in total 
investment and with IP, a dummy variable which indicates, rather or not, the firm owns 
intellectual property. (rs=0.459, p=0.000 and rs=0.323, p=0.003, respectively), lastly, 
R&D is significantly correlated with Grants (rs=0.431, p=0.000 two-tailed). 
 We may conclude that in our sample, the 28 firms who enjoyed public grants have 
much more financial resources of which they invest much more in R&D and intellectual 
property registration. It is important to mention that these relationships work both ways, 
as DFI policies favor firms who plan to invest in R&D and IP. However, it is also clear 
that the majority of incubator firms, who did not receive grants, remain financially 
vulnerable. 
 The differences between investment in Software and other Technology firms to those 
of traditional sectors are straightforward, however, according to a Mann-Whitney test 
(p=0.457), we may conclude that although sectors as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology 
and clean-technology usually require longer-term, complex and expensive research in 
comparison with software and telecommunications, in the region, they do not receive 
higher investments.  
 
4.6. Incubator’s Personnel, Entrepreneurs and firm’s personnel: 
 The incubators of PU have on average one PhD graduate and one Master graduate in 
its staff while in NPO´s the average is only 0.65 and 0.59 respectively. The first group 
also has, in average, one more scholarship fellow compared to NPOs. 





Secondary Technician  Bachelor Master Ph.D. 
Public Universities 2.00 3.13 1.60 1.00 0,33 2.40 1.00 1.00 





Graph 7 - Education level among Incubator Employees 
 
 However, in the 15 incubators belonging to Pus a strong correlation is found between 
PhD and Part-Time employees (rs=0.747, p=0.001), the same correlation is not 
significant regarding the 17 NPOs ((rs=0.367, p=0.148). 
 
Table 8 – Firm Owners and Employees  
 SUM Women Age Bach Mast PhD 
Firm Owners 2.72 0.45 34.4 1.37 0.49 0.56 
% Owners  17%  50.2% 18.1% 20.7% 
Software 2.87 8.5% 32.1 61.2% 14.7% 10.9% 
Other Tech 2.75 24.2% 38.1 24.2% 24.2% 42.4% 
Non Tech 2.47 25.5% 35 51% 19.1% 17% 
 SUM Full-T Part-T Scholarship Bach Mast PhD 
Employees 4.16 1,66 1,59 0,91 1,62 0,52 0,23 
% Employees  39.9% 38.2% 22% 45% 15% 7% 
Software 4.78 42.3% 35.6% 21.9% 40% 9.3% 2.8% 
Other Tech 4.79 40.9% 31.3% 27.8% 27.8% 22% 11.6% 
Non Tech 2.32 27.1% 65.5% 7.3% 52.7% 4.8% 7.6% 
 
 Table 8 provides us with characterization of firm owners and employees; we tested 
for correlations before drawing conclusions. The dummy variable for Software firms is 
negatively correlated with Owner’s Age, Women, Owner’s PhD and Employee’s PhD 
(rs= - 0.250, p-value=0.017, rs= - 0.302, p-value=0.004, rs= - 0.336, p-value=0.001, rs= 
- 0.292, p-value=0.015). It is positively correlated with Owner’s Bachelor Degree 
(rs=0.325, p-value=0.002). The second dummy, Technology (for biotechnology, 







Secondary Tech Bachelor Mast PhD
Public Uni 17,44% 5,81% 41,86% 17,44% 17,44%
NPOs 16,22% 10,81% 45,95% 13,51% 13,51%
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correlated with Owner’s Age, Owner’s and Employee’s PhD and Employee’s Master’s 
Degree (rs= 0.279, p-value=0.07, rs=0.424, p-value=0.000, rs=0.307, p-value=0.010, 
rs=0.406, p-value=0.000). It is negatively correlated with Owner’s Bachelor Degree 
(rs= - 0.372, p-value=0.000). 
Graphs 8, 9 - Firm Owners by Age and Education Field 
  
 It is therefore evident that software firms tend to have younger owners, less women 
entrepreneurs and in general more bachelors on the expense of PhDs, both regarding 
firm owners and employees. On the other hand, other technology firms are usually 
founded by older entrepreneurs with higher level of education, among them many more 
women; these firms also tend to employ more Masters and PhDs. 
 In general, the share of women entrepreneurs in the region is poor. In our sample, 
64% of the firms had no women at all among their owners, while no firm was found to 
have no male ownership. However, since the variable Women is also positively 
correlated with Entrepreneur’s Age and PhD (rs=0.342, p-value=0.001, rs=0.246, p-
value=0.022, respectively), we may conclude here that women tend to take part in 
business incubation mainly when they are older, and often with Master’s or PhDs 
(mostly in life sciences or engineering). Women between the ages of 20 to 30 are almost 
completely absent from our sample. 
 Interesting correlations are also found between Owner’s PhD and the dummy 
variable IP (rs=0.356 p-value=0.001), and between Investments and Full-Time 
employees (rs=0.548, p-value=0.000). It is quite intuitive that PhDs tend to file for more 


























intellectual property and that firms with higher investments tend to hire more full-time 
employees. 
 The most important point to be noted in this section is the appearance of two main 
groups of entrepreneurs, young bachelors and older PhDs (or masters). The young 
bachelor is usually between 25 to 35 years old; he has normally no financial 
independence, faces difficulties to raise investments and in many cases is criticized by 
family and society regarding his entrepreneurial adventure (Khalil & Olafsen, 2009-2010). In 
order to support himself, he has to hold for another job apart of managing his own firm. 
Even grants given by DFIs can’t change that situation since they do not allow salary 
payments for the entrepreneur (unlike in Israel, as presented earlier). On the other hand, 
the “Academic” entrepreneur is usually older, between 30 to 50 years of age, either he is 
a PhD graduate (or Master graduate) or doing his PhD, he often divides his time 
between the firm and other tasks as teaching and conducting academic researches.  
 Owning a firm is much more than a full-time job, it is a task of full dedication, 
particularly when dealing with an innovative and unconventional business-idea. 
Combine these characterizations of the entrepreneurs with the high correlation between 
PhD workers and Part-Time jobs in public incubators and with the high share of part-
time and scholarships among firms’ employees, we may confirm the impression 
described in the methodology that what we witness here is a phenomenon we may call, 
a part-time entrepreneurship. 
 
4.7. Incubators response to the firms’ needs 
 This section explores the personnel hired by business incubators and the services 
they provide to their incubated firms compared to the needs raised by corporate 
managers. 
 Firm managers were asked to rate on a Likert scale of 1 to 5, 13 factors that may 
have hindered their work. We divided them into three groups according to the results of 
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a Friedman test which showed a significant disparity between the answers (p-
value=0.000, results are reported in appendix 5): 
Table 9 – Barriers to Development 
High Level Medium Level Low Level 
Lack of financial resources 
for marketing, market studies 
and other administrative 
functions. 
Lack of Financial resources 
for R&D. 
Weak networking with 
government agencies, big 
firms and DFIs. 
Lack of partners in the region. 
Lack of qualified human resources. 
The region is underdeveloped.  
Lack of consulting. 
Lack of partners outside the region. 
Lack of Legal experience. 
Lack of managerial experience. 
Lack of market experience. 
Lack of experience with IP. 
Lack of technical experience. 
 
 We may clearly say that entrepreneurs attribute great importance to the lack of 
financial resources and networking, while they underestimated their own inexperience, 
although only 23.7% claimed to have any former experience in business development 
and management. 
 Incubators on the other hand were asked to report regarding eight different expertise, 
whether they hire professionals on a full-time or part-time basis or whether they hire 
their services through outsourcing. We ranked the answers by 3, 2 and 1 accordingly 
and 0 for none. 
 In order to verify and double-check, we presented the incubators 15 different services 
and asked if they provide them directly, by outsourcing or not at all (either due to lack 
of demand, or despite the demand). The answers were adjusted to a scale of 2, 1 and 0 
accordingly; lastly, the same list of services was given to firms in order to rate on a 
scale of 0 to 5 the incubators contribution (0 – the service is not provided, 5 – provided 
with high quality). 
 Regarding the incubators answers, variables for personnel with expertise in Legal, 
Consulting and Accounting issues were not correlated with the variables of the 
corresponding services, (Legal: rs=0.073, p=0.676, Consulting: rs=0.217, p=0.211 and 
Account: rs=0.060, p=0.732). However significant correlation was found regarding 
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intellectual property (rs=0.709, p=0.000). Despite that, sum of personnel was found to 
be correlated with sum of services. (rs=0.464, p=0.005). These sums are both positively 
correlated with incubator’s full time workers and only sum of personnel is correlated 
with number of incubated firms. (rs=0.408, p=0.015), naturally incubators with fewer 
incubated firms (12 out of 35 have five firms or less) hire less personnel. 
 The results regarding legal, consulting and accounting services are somewhat 
confusing; the reasons for a gap between the two different reports could be many. We 
conclude here that incubators may have the personnel, even if mainly by outsourcing, 
but in practice many services are not being used by the firms.  
 While incubators reports showed high incidence of personnel specified in legal, 
accounting and consulting, through the analysis of both incubators and firms’ answers 
we found that the corresponding services were weak (the results of three Friedman’ tests 
are reported in Appendix 5). It may be explained by the firm’s tendency to hire their 
own lawyer and accountant (if they may afford) in order not to reveal too much to the 
incubator, as a result of mistrust. This assumption is supported by a negative correlation 
which was found between investment and both legal and accounting services (rs= - 
0.256, p=0.026, rs= - 0.208, p=0.077) suggesting that since firms with high investment 
may afford to pay more for these services, they either miss value the quality of the 
services given by the incubator or prefer not to use them and in order to keep their 
secrecy. 
 Overall, the most common services to be offered were incubation, workshops and 
business plan. Firms were unhappy with financial support and market study, services 
which usually neither the incubators claimed to provide. Detection of potential 
partnerships out of the region was the service with the lowest score; it may teach us 
regarding the weak networking of incubators in the region.  
 Graph 10 shows that 53% of the incubators do not use the national network 
ANPROTEC and international networking hardly exists, networking with firms happens 
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mainly inside the incubator (Graph 11), and even so, in fact, only 18% reported to have 
real partnerships with incubated neighbors. 
Graph 10 - Incubator’s Networking  Graph 11 – Firm´s Networking 
  
  Apart of good relationships with DFIs, a fact that assists incubated firms to gain 
grants, all other aspects of networking, such as the access to potential clients or 
investors, are very weak and it comes in contrast with graph 12 which shows that 
networking is the main reason entrepreneurs choose to establish their firm in an 
incubator. Entrepreneurs in the region suffer heavy financial and cultural barriers 
regarding their contacts with the south of the country such as high cost of travel and 
feelings of inferiority (many entrepreneurs belief that potential investors and partners 
from the south underestimate the northeast region and its agents), it is therefore of 
utmost importance to reform the existing network. 
 
Graph 12 - Reasons to Approach an Incubator 
 
 Lastly, an emphasis should be given to the lack of permanent expert in 
entrepreneurship (3 full-time, 6 part-time, 21 outsourced and 5 empty spot), a category 







































every successful business incubator (Buys & Mbewana, 2006), moreover, in our vision the 
incubator’s manager should be such an expert. The formation of such an expertise may 
be a result of work experience, entrepreneurship or some managerial role; on the other 
hand, it could be fostered inside the incubator but requires a permanency in that position 
since it is a matter of years until such a manager is fit. However, such a permanency 
doesn’t seem to be the tendency in most of the region’s incubators. 
 
4.8. Selection Process 
 Each incubator had to choose three out of six most important criteria regarding firm 
selection; the results indicate that 91% of the incubators give importance to the quality 
of the idea and 83% focus on the seriousness of the entrepreneurs. However, in our 
interviews managers claimed that in many cases the idea changes during the process of 
pre-incubation, the entrepreneurs enter the incubator while the idea is yet immature and 
undefined and only after passing a learning process in the incubator, the final outcome 
may eventually be produced.  
Graph 13 – Criteria for Project Selection or Exclusion (n=31) 
 
 Moreover, only 51% consider the incubator´s ability to support the project and 
relatively low attention (37%) is given to the entrepreneur’s business culture and her 






































share of technology (include software) firms tend to underestimate the culture criterion 
even more (negatively correlated with the culture-criteria), while share of software 
firms is positively correlated with the importance (criterion) given to the discipline and 
ambition (rs= - 0.499, p=0.004, rs=0.363, p=0.045).  
 Many managers agreed in our interviews that the selection process is incorrect or 
incomplete and that more attention must be given to the entrepreneur´s culture. The 
importance of that criterion is well seen by the following analysis. Entrepreneurs were 
asked what is their perception regarding success, according to four scenarios, as seen in 
graph 14, I. Sell the firm, II. Sell the majority but stay as a partner-manager, III. Sell a 
minority and keep the control on the firm, IV. Graduate and grow independently with 
no partnerships. 
 
Graph 14 – Vision of Success 
 
 
 We may conclude that the majority of entrepreneurs do not enter the incubator in 
order to produce a start-up and sell it. Although it does not mean that when the day 
come and a buyer knocks on their door they wouldn’t sell, but it indicates a 
misperception of the incubated process and of start-up business. Taking Israel as an 
example, the start-up spirit is all about the “Exit” (selling the majority of the firm to a 
large enterprise), entrepreneurs dream about selling since the beginning, they are fully 
oriented for that purpose, many success stories provide them with “role models” which 
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view, the success is evaluated by how many private Dollars are invested in incubated 
and graduated firms per every public Dollars invested by the program. 
 As only 6.5% of entrepreneurs in our sample, stated that they established the firm 
due to a financial need, we expected to find more business spirit, however the answers 
may indicate that the entrepreneur, in his vision, becomes a manager of a small firm 
rather than a businessman and in that spot he sees himself staying.  
 Incubator managers provided us with several possible explanations. The first may be 
the lack of roll models and aspiration in the region, with low level of self-confidence 
produces low ambition among entrepreneurs. A second explanation is the lack of trust, 
many firm owners confessed their fears regarding having a partner, they believe that a 
partner may try to explore their firm for his purposes, steal their idea and sabotage their 
business activity in order to protect his other firms from competition.  
 Another aspect may be the lack of experience and recognition of modern business 
world, entrepreneurs may believe that their firms can grow-up to be national or 
international enterprises without raising external investment. Fortunately, as some 
incubator managers suggested, the younger generation is already showing sparks of 
modern entrepreneurial culture. We checked the distribution of answers between 
different age groups of entrepreneurs and though the differences are not extreme, there 
is a significant correlation between entrepreneur’s Age and Vision of success 
(transformed to an interval of 1 to 4) (rs=0.256, p=0.014). It seems that younger 
entrepreneurs are becoming more open for partnerships and more exit-oriented. 
  
 Surprisingly, answers regarding the amount of empty spaces in the incubator were 
not correlated (rs=0.044, p=0.802) with the level in which it has to promote the service 
in order to attract new firms (both on a Likert scale of 1 to 5), it is therefore hard to say 




 However, Correlation was found between Type (Tech/Mixed/Traditional) and the 
level in which an incubator has to promote. (rs=0.371, p-value=0.028) 
 According to a Mann-Whitney test, differences between traditional incubators and 
the other two types are statistically significant (Tech and Traditional: p=0,005, Mixed 
and Traditional: p=0,011). It seems that agro-traditional incubators have more need to 
promote the service and convince firms to participate.  
 The explanation lies within the hypothesis that traditional entrepreneurs in the 
region, with an emphasis on agriculturalists and local food or beverage producers, are 
more conservative in their view of incubators. Part of the essence of traditional 
incubator is to incubate small family firms in order to pass them through a process of 
standardization and certification, as well as increasing productivity by adapting modern 
methods, these firms may work on a small scale and many times without any 
registration and therefore, fear the transformation generated by the incubator. 
 
4.9. Intervention in firm’s management 
 
 This section explores the level in which an incubator is involved in firm’s 
management and interferes in decision making. One of the Israeli PTIP strongest points 
is the high level of intervention (although more by the OCS than by the incubator itself), 
strong and effective intervention by experts may eventually justify a broad public 
investments in these high-risk projects. 
Table 10 – Intervention Scale 
1 - Mild Intervention –  
The incubator provides 
consulting services and 
management support only when 
the firm shows initiative and need 
(entrepreneur’s initiative). 
3 - Moderate Intervention - 
The incubator monitors the 
firm's operations and 
periodically applies 
management control system, 
(joint initiative). 
5 - Intense Intervention –  
The incubator interferes 
constantly and intensively in the 
firm’s management and applies a 
strict management control 
system, (incubator’s initiative). 
 
 Incubators and firms were both asked to rank Intervention on a scale of 1 to 5 
according to the values above. In addition, incubators were asked to mark, on a Likert 
scale of 1 to 5, the level in which intervention in firm’s management increases due to 
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public investments. Lastly, the 28 firms in our sample, those who received grants from 
DFIs, were asked to rank (on a Likert scale of 1 to 5) the level of intervention by the 
DFI (SEBRAE or FINEP in most cases), 25 answered. 
Table 11 – Intervention according to 35 Incubators Table 12 – Intervention according to Firms 
 Intervention 
Change In 
Intervention due to 
public investments 
  Intervention 
Intervention 
by DFI 
Mean 2.5429 3.3429  Mean 1.76 1.92 
Std. 
Deviation 




Median 3.0000 3.0000  Median 1.00 1.0000 
Weighted 
AVG 
2.40 3.44  N 93 25 
 
 Firms evaluated the level of intervention (mean=1.76), much lower than Incubators 
did (mean=2.54), furthermore the medians indicate a greater discrepancy, 3 against 1. 
 The results of a Mann Whitney test suggest that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the level of intervention described by incubators and the level as 
described by firms (p-value=0.000). It can be further concluded that incubated firms’ 
perception of incubator’s intervention statistically significant lower than it is perceived 
by the incubators themselves. 
 Since the firms’ sample does not equally represent all incubators we calculated two 
weighted means (and medians), by multiplying the Intervention levels as answered by 
each incubator in the number of firms (from that incubator) which participated in our 
sample. The weighted means (medians) were: 2.4 (2) for Intervention and 3.5 (4) for 
change in intervention due to public investment. A Mann-Whitney test suggested again 
that the weighted average of intervention level as described by incubators differs 
significantly from the level marked by the firms (p-value =0.000). 
 However, the question addressed to firms regarding the change in intervention due to 
public investments referred to intervention by public entity (SEBRAE, FINEP and 
others) and not by the incubator. Therefore two more means were calculated in order to 




 We compared between intervention level as described by firms with Public Funds 
(28) and firms who declared not to have any (61), as we see in the report; there is no 
difference between the two groups neither regarding Means nor Medians. 
Table 13 – Intervention for public and private funding 
Public Funds Mean N Std. Deviation Median 
Not received 1.77 61 ,956 1,00 
Received 1.71 28 ,937 1,00 
 
 We may clearly state that incubators in the region do not serve significantly as 
instruments for regulating the passage of public funds into private firms.  
 An interesting paradox was found while testing for correlations between investments 
and intervention, using both incubator answers and firm answers. Incubators 
Intervention level was strongly correlated with Investment Average (rs=0.536, p=0.018) 
while on the firms point of view, the variables were negatively correlated (rs= - 0.224, 
p=0.040). We conclude that while incubators believe to perform their role better when it 
comes to firms with higher investment volume and therefore with higher potential, 
wealthier firms actually feel more isolated and independent or on the other hand it might 
be their wish to be autonomous and not interfered.  
 
4.10. Graduation 
 A total number of 224 firms graduated from incubators in the last five years, an 
average of 6.8 per incubator with a standard deviation equal to 7.7 and a median of 4 
firms. An incubator of NPO has in average 9.5 (median of 5) graduated firms in the last 
five years while a PU incubator has only 3.8 (median of 4), statistical tests regarding 
this matter are showing no significant difference, however, six incubators indicated 
more than 10 graduated firms each and they are responsible for 54% of all graduation in 
the region. Incubatep (PE) with 35, CENTEC (CE) with 30, PADETEC (CE) with 20 
graduates, ITCG (PB) 15, Incubanectar (PE) and Porto Digital (PE) with 11 for each, all 
six incubators are belonging to NPOs. 
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Graph 15, 16 – Firm Graduation 
 
 Spearman‘s coefficient suggests a correlation between the incubator’s age and the 
number of graduated firms, Porto Digital in Recife is the only incubator to show good 
results in spite of having only few years of operation. Number of Graduate seems to 
correlate with Number of Firms as well. Both results are intuitive, as larger and the 
more experienced the incubator is, the better it performs (Number of Graduate with: 
Age, rs=0.422, p=0.014, and with Number of Firm, rs=0.461, p=0.007). 
 Incubators were asked to mark the level of contact they keep with graduates on a 
scale of 1 to 5. The values are displayed in table 14. 
Table 14 – Levels of Contact with Graduate Firms 
 N  
1 - The incubator has no contact with graduates 5 14.3% 
2 4 11.4% 
3 - The incubator keeps regular contact but does not contain data about 
graduates activities, their sales, number of employee etc. 
19 54.3% 
4 3 8.6^ 
5 - The incubator keeps a strong contact and runs a database of graduates’ 
business activity with  the purpose of evaluating the incubation process 
4 11.4% 
 
 Although at least 26 may maintain contacts, only seven incubators in the region 
claim to perform some kind of monitoring system which may allow them to evaluate the 
incubation process based on the performance of graduate firms. This finding is 
supported by interviews and visits in almost half the incubators in the region, as well as 






























































firms and their performance. It seems that there is no organized registration of sales, 
number of workers, survival rate etc.  
 The complexity, at best, or the inability, at worst, to evaluate the results of a mainly 
public funded process is wrong and may raise questions regarding the efficacy of 
incubation in the region. 
 Finally, incubators were asked to mark how graduation is taking part. As seen in 
graph 17, 57% of the incubators have no fixed policy and the decision is taken by 
assessment of the firm´s condition and a joint decision, 31% of the incubators are fixing 
a time period for incubation while only two incubators define the period in advance for 
each firm individually. Lastly, two incubators are using financial incentives (increasing 
service fee) to stimulate firms to leave. 
Graph 17 – Graduation Method 
 
 The conclusion seems straightforward. An incubation process which has no defined 
deadline has no defined goals and it will naturally struggle to deliver impacts. In-fact, 
many firms in the region stay incubated for many years and although in some cases, 
graduation seems to be challenging due to lack of supporting infrastructure outside the 
university’s walls, staying under the protective wings of the incubator with its low-cost 
services may prevent the firm from becoming competitive and mature (Corinne , Adkins , 
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 An entrepreneurial culture marked by lack of trust, vision and experience, plus the 
lack of capital and networking and a weak link between the university and the industry, 
these elements of the Brazilian northeast reality constitute an obstacle to innovative 
entrepreneurship and therefore, may justify the investment in business incubators. 
 The region’s incubators provide opportunities for academic professionals to engage 
in entrepreneurship and some incubators produced a significant number of graduated 
firms in the last five years. However, as we have seen, goals are not clearly defined, 
neither the incubation framework, most incubators are not business driven, they lack 
financial and administrative independence, their staff is not exclusively focused on the 
incubator management and they suffer from financial instability which then trickles 
downward to the incubated projects. Most important, performance is hard to measure, 
since graduated firms are not being monitored. 
Conclusion 1 – There is a need for a directing hand, meaning a policy as well as a 
federal law that would arrange, confederate and increase the public investments in 
incubated firms in the region. This policy should define, broadly and as clearly as 
possible, the objectives of these investments; it should plan how incubators may 
conduct financially and with stability and make some order in the chaos which prevails 
in that field today. Any firm who receives public investment must commit to accept the 
incubator’s authority and act in transparency regarding its performance in order to allow 
monitoring and evaluation.  
 Incubators, on their part, have to adopt a selection method which emphasizes the 
search for competent partnership-oriented entrepreneurs. As we have seen, the majority 
of entrepreneurs do not understand the concept of start-up firm as it being perceived in 
developed markets. Apart from giving it the weight during the selection process, an 
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incubator should advocate its new entrepreneurs to search for partnerships and external 
investors in exchange for shares. 
 Moreover, the incubator should get involved regularly in overseeing projects’ 
management and must set a fix incubation period in order to eliminate the current 
situation in which firms may stay incubated for many years and avoid graduation. 
Conclusion 2 – Current public investment per project is insufficient and it casts doubt 
regarding the ability of the project to succeed; in addition, since grants may not be used 
to pay entrepreneurs’ salaries, there is a paradoxical situation in which an insufficient 
public investment supports an entrepreneur who may dedicate only a small part of his 
time to the project. Furthermore, about 70% of the incubated firms do not receive public 
grants and due to the absence of private investments, most of them are struggling to 
survive. 
Conclusion 3 – There is a need to promote the existing incubators, one step toward 
financial autonomy. As we have seen, seniority and experience are crucial for 
incubators’ performance, it is better to take advantage of what was done so far and not 
to build exclusively on new institutions. The PU incubators should operate as an 
administratively separate unit by getting their own annual budget and if not physically 
disengage from the institution, at the least, disconnect at the financial and managerial 
level in order to create a proactive business attitude inside a context dominated by 
bureaucracy and hierarchy. 
 An incubator of a NPO should be unchained from the different institutions authority 
and perhaps even be oriented for profitability or at least, self-sustainability. The best 
ones should enter a pilot program which may possibly be inspired by the Israeli model. 
In such a model they will act as business accelerators and form partnerships with the 
incubated projects. Clearly, for that to be implemented, federal legislation should be 
passed to allow public entities (namely, universities) to form for-profit organizations 
since today in-order to benefit from public grants an institution must be defined as a 
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NPO. It seems that such a law would be a real political innovation in light of the current 
aversion which exists in Brazil, regarding “mixing” between the public and the private. 
 The use of market mechanisms in that system is an effective way to introduce 
business approach and create entrepreneurial ambitions which are absent today at 
northeastern incubators.  
Conclusion 4 –Most of the entrepreneurs are aware of the importance of networking 
and expect in vain for the incubator to provide it. We must acknowledge that the 
questionnaires which were used, not fully hit the target on this matter, therefore this 
study struggles to analyze why networking fails in the region. With their different age 
and level of experience the incubators face different stages in their learning cycle; it 
seems that new or weak incubators could largely benefit from the interaction with the 
older and more successful ones. Our suggestion for further researches is to examine 
how networking occurs in the southern regions and how cultural differences affect the 
performance of this function. 
Conclusion 5 - The last point for discussion is the prevalence of incubated software 
firms. That phenomenon may result from the inability to raise funds for investment in 
more expensive sectors or simply from a current fad for building software and websites. 
However, we recommend to delve into the question of whether these firms benefit from 
the physical proximity to the university at the expense of the distance from city center 
or industry areas. Policy makers should consider the establishment of clusters (such as 
Porto Digital, Recife) where firms could enjoy services such as business brokerage and 
marketing services which will connect them with the south of the country. 
 There is a great potential in innovative entrepreneurship in the region, but as we 
found, the number of biotechnology and clean-technology firms is low. Brazil has 
perhaps the world’s greatest natural treasures and it holds a rich and unique knowledge 
of thousands years old, regarding its flora and fauna with its special virtues. On the 
other hand, the lack of adequate policies and inefficiency in resource allocation (López-
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Claros & Mata, 2010-2011), floods the region with enormous environmental problems. 
Developing these sectors by using business incubators with the appropriate management 
and with a broader public investment, may be a real engine for the regional growth. 
 
Limitations: 
 The lack of data regarding graduated firms prevents us from being able to point at the 
incubator’s true social and economic impact in the region. Thanks to some failures we 
revile in this paper, we may estimate that the impact is weak and that there is a big 
potential for improvement.  
 Some parts of our questionnaires could have been improved, examples are the 
networking chapter in which we did not manage to obtain very interesting results and in 
general the use of Likert scale seems to be too abstract and subjected to subjectivity. 
 Lastly, the geographical distance between the different states and the high cost of 
travel, limited the research and prevent us from visiting in more incubators, particularly 
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Appendix 1 – List of Incubators 
Name State Institution Type Firms Answers % 
NIEP - Pindorama ALAGOAS Non-Profit Organization Traditional, Agro 14 0 0% 
INCUBAL ALAGOAS Public University Technology 17 8 47% 
UNISCAL, UNITEC ALAGOAS Public University Mixed 4 3 75% 
INCLA - SENAI ALAGOAS Non-Profit Organization Traditional, Agro 15 0 0% 
IET - CESMAC ALAGOAS Non-Profit Organization Mixed 10 3 30% 
INETI, CEPEDI, 
Ilehus BAHIA Non-Profit Organization Technology 
3 2 
66% 
INCUBATEC BAHIA Public University Mixed 5 2 40% 
UNIFCAS BAHIA Private Technology 6 2 33% 
INOVAPOLI BAHIA Public University Technology 3 2 66% 
CENA BAHIA Non-Profit Organization Technology 8 2 25% 
INCUBAUECE CEARA Public University Mixed 9 2 22% 
PADETEC CEARA Non-Profit Organization Technology 16 4 25% 
INCUBTIC, ITIC CEARA Non-Profit Organization Technology 7 2 29% 
INTECE - CENTEC CEARA Non-Profit Organization Mixed 20 3 15% 
EDETEC CEARA Non-Profit Organization Technology 12 7 58% 
NUTEC - PARTEC CEARA Public University Mixed 5 2 40% 
IFCE CEARA Public University Mixed 12 3 25% 
INCUBEM MARANHAO Public University Technology 6 2 33% 
ITCG Campina Gr PARAIBA Non-Profit Organization Mixed 18 7 39% 
INCUBATEP - ITEP PERNAMBUCO Non-Profit Organization Technology 18 6 33% 
Sugere PERNAMBUCO Private Mixed 0 0 0% 
INCUBANECTAR PERNAMBUCO Non-Profit Organization Mixed 11 2 18% 
CESAR PERNAMBUCO Non-Profit Organization Technology 3 1 33% 
Incubatec Rural PERNAMBUCO Public University Traditional, Agro 5 3 60% 
INCUBADORA DO 
CABO PERNAMBUCO Non-Profit Organization Traditional, Agro 
2 0 
0% 
Porto Digital PERNAMBUCO Non-Profit Organization Technology 17 5  
POSITIVA UFPE PERNAMBUCO Public University Technology 0 2 * 
INCOPE RN Non-Profit Organization Mixed 4 6 * 
NATA - UFRN RN Public University Technology 12 5 42% 
IFRN RN Public University Mixed 7 2 29% 
IAGRAM RN Public University Traditional, Agro 14 0 0% 
INEAGRO RN Public University Traditional, Agro 12 0 0% 
CITECS RN Public University Mixed 9 0 0% 
CISE SERGIPE Non-Profit Organization Technology 13 5 38% 
I-TEC SERGIPE Private Technology 3 0 0% 
    320 93 29% 




Appendix 2 – 4.2. Sustainability and Budget - Statistical tests 
Mann-Whitney Test – Sustainability by Ownership 
Ranks 
 Ownership N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Sustainability 
2 17 18,79 319,50 
3 15 13,90 208,50 





Mann-Whitney U 88,500 
Wilcoxon W 208,500 
Z -1,801 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,072 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] ,142
b
 
a. Grouping Variable: Ownership 
b. Not corrected for ties. 
 
Mann-Whitney Test – Sustainability by Groups of Incubator´s Age 
Ranks 
 YoungOldFirm N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Sustainability 
,00 17 15,06 256,00 
1,00 18 20,78 374,00 





Mann-Whitney U 103,000 
Wilcoxon W 256,000 
Z -2,078 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,038 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] ,103
b
 
a. Grouping Variable: YoungOldFirm 
b. Not corrected for ties. 
 
Mann-Whitney Test – Budget by Ownership 
Ranks 
 Ownership N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Budget 
2 17 20,24 344,00 
3 15 12,27 184,00 





Mann-Whitney U 64,000 
Wilcoxon W 184,000 
Z -2,584 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,010 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] ,016
b
 
a. Grouping Variable: Ownership 





Appendix 3 – 4.3. Goals and Impacts - Statistical tests 
Friedman Test - Goals 
Ranks 











Asymp. Sig. ,039 
a. Friedman Test 
 
Friedman Test - Goals 
Ranks 











Asymp. Sig. ,000 
a. Friedman Test 
 
Friedman Test - Impacts 
Ranks 










Asymp. Sig. ,079 
a. Friedman Test 
 
Friedman Test - Impacts 
Ranks 










Asymp. Sig. ,050 
a. Friedman Test 
 
Appendix 4 – 4.5. Investment Volume - Statistical tests 




 IncOrFirm N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Investment 
1,00 19 68,42 1300,00 
2,00 85 48,94 4160,00 





Mann-Whitney U 505,000 
Wilcoxon W 4160,000 
Z -2,546 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,011 
a. Grouping Variable: IncOrFirm 
Mann-Whitney Test – Investment by ownerships 
Ranks 
 Ownership N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Investment 
2 51 38,48 1962,50 
3 32 47,61 1523,50 





Mann-Whitney U 636,500 
Wilcoxon W 1962,500 
Z -1,681 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,093 
a. Grouping Variable: Ownership 
Mann-Whitney Test – Investment by public funds  
Ranks 
 Public_Funds N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Investment 
0 55 32,44 1784,00 
1 28 60,79 1702,00 





Mann-Whitney U 244,000 
Wilcoxon W 1784,000 
Z -5,070 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
a. Grouping Variable: Public_Funds 





N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Investment 
,00 39 30,19 1177,50 
1,00 23 33,72 775,50 





Mann-Whitney U 397,500 
Wilcoxon W 1177,500 
Z -,744 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,457 
a. Grouping Variable: 
Technology_Firm_Not_Software 
 
Appendix 5 – 4.7. Incubators response - Statistical tests 
 
Friedman Test - Barriers to Development 
Ranks 






















Asymp. Sig. ,000 
a. Friedman Test 
 
Friedman Test – Personnel in Incubators 
Ranks 















Asymp. Sig. ,000 





Friedman Test – Services according to incubators 
Ranks 






















Asymp. Sig. ,000 
a. Friedman Test 
 
 
Friedman Test – Services according to firms 
Ranks 






















Asymp. Sig. ,000 







Appendix 6 – 4.8. Selection Process - Statistical tests 
 
Mann-Whitney Test – Promotion by Techonlogy and Traditional incubators 
Ranks 
 Type N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Sel_Promotion 
1 16 9,22 147,50 
3 6 17,58 105,50 





Mann-Whitney U 11,500 
Wilcoxon W 147,500 
Z -2,840 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,005 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] ,005
b
 
a. Grouping Variable: Type 
b. Not corrected for ties. 
 
Mann-Whitney Test – Promotion by Mixed and Traditional incubators 
 
Ranks 
 Type N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Sel_Promotion 
2 13 7,85 102,00 
3 6 14,67 88,00 





Mann-Whitney U 11,000 
Wilcoxon W 102,000 
Z -2,547 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,011 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] ,012
b
 
a. Grouping Variable: Type 





Appendix 7 – 4.9. Intervention - Statistical tests 
 
Mann-Whitney Test – Intervention by incubators and firms 
Ranks 
 IncOrFirm N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Intervention 
1,00 35 84,20 2947,00 
2,00 93 57,09 5309,00 





Mann-Whitney U 938,000 
Wilcoxon W 5309,000 
Z -3,943 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
a. Grouping Variable: IncOrFirm 
 
 
Mann-Whitney Test - Intervention by firms and a weighted average of incubators  
Ranks 
 IncOrFirm N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Intervention 
1,00 93 110,86 10310,00 
2,00 93 76,14 7081,00 





Mann-Whitney U 2710,000 
Wilcoxon W 7081,000 
Z -4,648 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 









1. Nome da entidade:   2. Mantenedora: 
3. Localidade (Cidade, Estado):  
4. Ano de criação: 
 
(Se não for indicado o contrário, sempre pode marcar mais de uma resposta) 
I – Constituição e financiamento 
5. Qual é o tipo da incubadora?   
Tecnológica Abriga produtos, processos e serviços que resultam da pesquisa 
cientifica. 
 
Tradicional Abriga empreendimentos ligados aos sectores da economia que detém 
tecnologias difundidas e que querem agregar valor aos seus produtos, 
processos e serviços. 
 
 
Mista Abriga empresas de base tecnológica tradicionais.  
Agro-industrial   
Privada   
Cooperativa   
 
6. Constituição da incubadora:  
Universidade / instituto de ensino federal  
Universidade / instituto de ensino estadual  
Universidade / instituto de ensino privado  
Empresa privada  
Instituto de fomento ao desenvolvimento  
Outros __________________________________  
 
7. Financiamento da operação da 
incubadora: 
0% 1%-25% 26%-50% 51%-75% 76%-100% 
Subvenção Federal      
Subvenção Estadual      
Instituição de fomento ao 
desenvolvimento 
     
Instituto privado de ensino      
Industria – empresa pública      
Industria – empresa privada      
Rendimento da prestação de serviço      
 
8. Auto Sustentabilidade da incubadora (Marque apenas uma opção):   





A incubadora tem saldo positivo  
A Incubadora é sustentável (ponto de equilíbrio)  
A Incubadora é quase sustentável e está no caminho a se tornar.  
A incubadora consegue financiar mais de 50% dos seus gastos.  
A incubadora consegue financiar menos de 50% dos seus gastos  
 
9. Orçamento (Marque apenas uma opção):    
A incubadora tem um orçamento anual/semianual e está mantendo-o 
rigorosamente. 
 
Tem orçamento anual/semianual mas normalmente excede-o e tem que buscar 
fundos para manter a sua atividade 
 
Tem orçamento anual/semianual mas está insuficiente e está constantemente à 
procura de capital adicional para realizar as suas atividades 
 
Tem orçamento de curto prazo e está constantemente a procura de capital para 
realizar as suas atividades. 
 
Não existe orçamento, a incubadora está constantemente à procura de capital 
para realizar as atividades 
 
Outro: ____________________________________________________________  
 
II – Objetivos e Tipologia 
10. Dos seguintes objetivos, classifique a importância de cada um para a incubadora? 
Em uma escala de 1 (Pouco importante) 
a 5 (Muito importante) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Criar empregos, promover o desenvolvimento 
e inclusão social 
     
Comercialização de inovações e conhecimento 
da universidade/instituto de ensino superior 
     
Promoção de capital humano      
Desenvolvimento da cultura empreendedora      
Gerar lucro para a incubadora      
 
III - Pessoal 
11. Indique o número de colaboradores de tempo da incubadora de tempo:  
Integral: _____, parcial:_____, bolsistas: _____ 
12. Quantos colaboradores possuem nível académico? 
Colaboradores com Ensino médio –______ 
Colaboradores com Graduação – _______ 
Colaboradores com nível técnico --_______ 
Colaboradores com Mestrado – _______ 




 13. A incubadora emprega ou contrata os serviços de especialistas das seguintes áreas/experiências: 
 FulL-time Part.-time Outsourcing Nenhum 
Académica (Professores de ensino)     
Pesquisa académica     
Especialistas de Empreendedoríssimo (empresário/a)     
Engenheira / pesquisa aplicada     
Gestão/Contabilidade     
Assessoria jurídica     
Consultoria     
Propriedade industrial/intelectual     
 
IV - Efeitos 
16. Quais são na sua opinião os resultados alcançados até agora pela incubadora?  
Em uma escala de 1 (não alcançado) 
e 5 (alcançado)  
1 2 3 4 5 
Criar empregos, promover o desenvolvimento 
e inclusão social 
     
Comercialização de inovações e conhecimento 
da universidade/instituto de ensino superior 
     
Promoção de capital humano      
Desenvolvimento da cultura empreendedora      
 
V – Empresas incubadas 
17. Indique o número de empresas incubadas e pré incubadas: ___________ 
18. Qual a sua estimativa do o valor médio do investimento (inicial + despesas) dos projetos 
incubados nos primeiros dois anos ?  _____________ 
19. Clientes - Indique o Setor de Atividade das incubadas (número de empresas): 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Agro-negócio           
Alimentos e Bebidas           
Automação, Electrônica, 
Matérias e Componentes 
          
Comércio           
Construção           
Energia           
Logística e Transportes           
Meio-ambiente e Clean-tech           






          
Turismo           
 
VI – Processo de seleção  
20. Em relação ao processo de seleção de novos projetos, qual a relevância dos seguintes 
aspectos?: 
Em uma escala de 1 (Pouco relevante) 
A 5 (Muito relevante) 
1 2 3 4 5 
A incubadora tem que promover o serviço para 
aumentar a demanda 
     
A incubadora tem normalmente poucas vagas 
abertas para novos empreendedores entrarem 
no processo 
     
Existe um método rigoroso de seleção de 
projetos, incluindo a participação de 
especialistas no específico área de negócios. 
     
Os avaliadores que participam na seleção do 
projeto mantêm contato com o projeto durante 
o tempo de incubação. 
     
 
21. Marque os três fatores mais importantes em relação ao processo de seleção de projetos: 
A ideia do negócio é inovadora (tem concorrência reduzida) e parece promissora  
Os perfis dos empreendedores - Os empreendedores parecem disciplinados e ambiciosos    
A Incubadora considera a capacidade ou a incapacidade do projeto ser desenvolvido sem processo 
de incubação 
 
A necessidade da incubadora alugar espaço livre ou, por outro lado, a indisponibilidade do espaço  
A cultura de negócios dos empreendedores é favorável para poder trabalhar em parceria com 
investidores. 
 
A incubadora (junto com o seu instituto supervisor) possui a capacidade e o conhecimento técnico 






VII – Apoio às empresas e controle de metas 
 22. Em relação aos seguintes serviços: 













Apoio à constituição legal de empresas     
Apoios financeiros à criação de empresas     
Canal para a criação de relacionamentos com 
parceiros estratégicos 
    
Identificação e ligação a fundos financeiros     
Consultoria Estratégica     
Apoio ao Marketing     
Apoio a Contabilidade     
Realização de Estudos de mercado     
Apoio ao registro de Propriedade industrial     
Apoio na elaboração do Plano de Negócios     
Disponibilização de instalações (incubação)     
Organização de Workshops/Seminários     
Normalização/Certificação     
Infra-estrutura laboratorial (interior ou exterior 
a incubadora) para pesquisa aplicada 
    
Formação Profissional     
 
23. Indique o nível da intervenção da incubadora na gestão da empresa em acordo com esses valore 
1 – Intervenção leve - A incubadora presta serviço de consultoria e apoio às funções de gestão só quando a 
empresa mostra  iniciativa e  necessidade. (iniciativa do empreendedor) 
3 – Intervenção moderada - A incubadora acompanha as ações da empresa, implicando um sistema de 
controle de metas periodicamente. (iniciativa conjunta)  
5 – Intervenção intensa - A incubadora atua com uma intervenção constante e intensiva na gestão da 
empresa com um sistema rigoroso de controle de metas. (iniciativa da incubadora) 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
24. O nível de intervenção (os valores da última resposta), aumenta quando a empresa incubada recebe 
capital das instituições de apoio ao desenvolvimento (fundos públicos): 
Em uma escala de 1 (Não 
concordo) a 5 (Concordo 
totalmente) 
1 2 3 4 5 





VIII – Graduação  
25. Qual é o parâmetro tomado como decisão para uma empresa incubada graduar?  
Elabora-se uma análise da situação da empresa e toma-se uma decisão em conjunto com a 
empresa 
 
Existe um tempo fixo igual para todas as empresas que termina o plano da incubação  
Existe um tempo fixo individual para cada empresa que termina o plano da incubação  
A incubadora aumenta os custos de aluguel e/ou serviços oferecidos até que a empresa toma a 
decisão de graduar (incentivos para graduar) 
 
 
26. Nível de contato com empresas graduadas: 
Em uma escala de 1 a 5 quando: 
1 - A incubadora não está em contato com as empresas graduadas 
3 - A incubadora mantem contato periodicamente mas não contem dados sobre as atividades das empresas 
graduadas 
5 - A incubadora mantem contato constante e gerência base de dados das empresas graduadas com o fim 
de avaliar o processo de incubação 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
27. Quantas empresas graduavam nos últimos 5 anos? _____ 
 
IX – Networking e mediação 
28. O que faz a incubadora para promover networking e spill-over de conhecimento entre as empresas 
incubadas? 
Intranet  Palestras  
Eventos de socialização  Seminários  
Jornais  Revistas  
Competições  Encoraja parcerias entre empresas  
29. O que faz a incubadora para promover networking com outras incubadoras/entidades 
Faz parte de rede estadual  Faz parte de rede nacional  
Mantém aliança com outra/s incubadora/s  Mantem acordos institucionais  
Acordos internacionais    
  
30. Que serviço(s) geralmente procura quando contata uma Rede incubadoras? 
Oportunidades de Negócio  
Parceiros Estratégicos de Negócio  
Novos Contatos Institucionais de Apoio à Internacionalização  
Informação de Mercados de outros estados  
Divulgação dos Produtos/Serviços  
Legislação e Informação sobre o funcionamento do Mercado  









1. Nome da empresa: 
2. Localidade (incubadora):  
3. Ano de criação: 
 
(Se não for indicado o contrário, sempre pode marcar mais de uma resposta) 
 
I – Financiamento e auto-sustentabilidade 
4. Qual foi o investimento (inicial + despesas operacionais) do projeto nos primeiros dois anos (no caso da 
empresa existir há menos de dois anos, responder até a presente data)? ________________________ 
5. Origem do financiamento do 
investimento (Capital inicial + despesas 
operacionais) nos primeiros dois anos 
(%): 
0% 1%-25% 26%-50% 51%-75% 76%-100% 
Capital próprio (pessoal)      
Emprestado de Instituição de fomento ao 
desenvolvimento 
     
Editais de Instituição de fomento ao 
desenvolvimento 
     
Bancos      
Empresa Privada (spin-out)      
Investimento privado – Anjos ou empresas 
de capital de risco 
     
Faturamento com vendas e prestação de 
serviços 
     
6. Que percentagem do financiamento da empresa é pago em salários a pesquisadores, na manutenção de 
laboratórios e no desenvolvimento de prototipos e testes de mercado? (% investimento em Pesquisa e 
Desenvolvimento - estimativa)   ______________ 
7. A empresa tem algum registro de propriedade intelectual? 





Logos Design Marcas 
      
 
8. No caso de haver financiamento externo (além do capital próprio), até que nível o 
credor/investidor toma parte e interfere na gestão da sua empresa? 
Em uma escala de 1 (não interfere)  
a 5 (interfere intensivamente) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Empréstimos de Instituição de fomento ao 
desenvolvimento 
     
Editais de Instituição de fomento ao      






Bancos      
Empresa Privada (spin-out)      
Investimento privado – Anjos ou empresas de 
capital de risco 
     
  
9. No ultimo ano de atividade (2012): Sim Não 
A empresa é auto-sustentável ou lucrativa   
A empresa tem faturamento   
A empresa esta crescendo   
10. Caso a empresa venda produtos/serviços, o faturamento esta 
feito em nome (CNPJ) da: 
Incubadora Empresa 
1.    
 
11. Em que fase está a empresa atualmente? 
i. Desenvolvimento básico do produto  
ii. O(s) produto(s) está(o) em fase final antes de comercialização  
iii. O produto está começando a ser comercializado  
iv. O produto está comercializado, mas a empresa ainda investe significativamente em 
desenvolvimento do produto 
 
v. O(s) produto(s) está pronto, a empresa investe principalmente em marketing  
12. Referente à última pergunta, marque em que nível a falta de recursos financeiros impede que a 
empresa avance à próxima fase: 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
II – Área de negocio e origem da ideia 
13. Indique o Setor de Atividade da empresa: 
Serviços  Construção  
Software, E-learning, Telecomunicações  Química, Farmacêutica e 
Biotecnologia 
 
Comércio  Comunicação   
Alimentos e Bebidas  Agronegócio  
Turismo  Meio-ambiente e Clean-tech  
Energia  Logística e Transportes  
 
14. Em relação à origem da ideia do negócio e à motivação que teve o empreendedor na 





O desejo de iniciar um negócio já existia antes de ter a ideia   
A ideia tem origem na experiência acadêmica do empreendedor como estudante ou pesquisador   
A ideia é resultado de uma pesquisa científica   
xvii 
 
A ideia tem origem na experiência profissional dos empreendedores   
A ideia surgiu a partir de uma necessidade do mercado   
A ideia foi iniciativa de uma empresa produtora ou prestadora de serviços que fez parceria com 
os empreendedores para produzir soluções (spin-out) 
  
O empreendedor formou a empresa e desenvolveu a ideia por necessidade financeira (não 
conseguiu obter um emprego e salário desejável) 
  
Alguns dos empreendedores já tiveram experiência anterior em empreendedorismo?    
 
15. Leia atentamente e escolha quais foram as duas razões principais para estabelecer a empresa 
dentro de uma incubadora? 
Os empreendedores vêm do mesmo instituto de ensino onde esta localizada a 
incubadora 
 
O empreendedor teve falta de conhecimento técnico e o instituto ao qual a incubadora 
pertence tem este conhecimento 
 
A incubadora oferece proximidade de infra-estrutura acadêmica (laboratórios, 
bibliotecas, recursos humano etc.) 
 
A incubadora pode fornecer experiência de gestão empresarial que os 
empreendedores não têm 
 
Existe uma vantagem na rede de conhecimentos que a incubadora fornece 
(investidores, organizações de fomento, clientes, outras empresas e mais…) 
 
Testemunhos e histórias de sucesso de empresas que estão ou que foram incubadas  
A Infra-estrutura e os serviços prestados por baixo custo  
 
III - Pessoal 
16. Indique o número de empreendedores (sócios) que formam a empresa: 
17. Entre os empreendedores indique o numero de mulheres: 
18. Qual é a idade média dos empreendedores na sua empresa: 
 
19. Quantos empreendedores possuem 
nível académico? 
Nº de empreendedores com Ensino médio: _______ 
Nº de empreendedores técnicos  _______ 
Nº de empreendedores com Graduação  _______ 
Nº de empreendedores com Mestrado  _______ 
Nº de empreendedores com Doutoramento  _______ 
 
20. Qual é a área acadêmica dos empreendedores? 
Economia e administração  Química  Física  
Biologia  Sociologia, ciência politica, 
filosofia 
 Informática  
Engenheira  Direito  Medicina, Farmácia 
(Saúde) 
 




21-23. Indique o número de colaboradores (alem dos empreendedores) da empresa:  
Tempo inteiro: ___________ , Tempo parcial: ___________ ,  Bolsistas: ___________ 
24. Quantos colaboradores possuem 
nível acadêmico? 
Nº de colaboradores com Ensino médio:  _______ 
Nº de colaboradores técnicos _______ 
Nº de colaboradores com Graduação  _______ 
Nº de colaboradores com Mestrado  _______ 
Nº de colaboradores com Doutoramento  _______ 
 
IV – Objectivo, visão dos empreendedores 
25. Como o empreendedor PERCEBE o sucesso da empresa? 
A empresa poderá ser vendida a uma empresa maior  
A empresa poderá ser vendida a uma empresa maior, que terá o domínio (mais de 50%) 
mas os empreendedores ficarão com a opção de continuar trabalhando na empresa como 
gerentes/consultores… 
 
Parte da empresa será vendida para aumentar o capital e devolver o investimento, mas o 
controle da empresa permanecerá com os empreendedores (mais de 50%) 
 
A empresa vai graduar e crescer independentemente  
26. Considerando a sua própria experiência como empreendedor na incubadora, classifique o peso 
dos seguintes fatores no que diz respeito às dificuldades enfrentadas pela sua empresa: 
Em uma escala de 1 (Pouco relevante) 
a 5 (Muito relevante) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Falta de recursos financeiros para P&D      
Falta de recursos financeiros para Marketing, 
estudo de mercado e outras funções de gestão 
     
Falta de conhecimento e experiência técnica 
dos empreendedores 
     
Falta de conhecimento e experiência 
administrativa dos empreendedores 
     
Falta de conhecimento e experiência jurídicos      
Falta de conhecimento e experiência referente 
ao registro de propriedade intelectual 
     
Falta de experiência e conhecimento de 
mercado 
     
Falta de recursos humanos qualidicados      
Falta de parceiros estratégicos dentro da região      
Falta de parceiros estratégicos fora da região      
Baixo nível de desenvolvimento econômico local 
e regional 
     
Falta de consultoria profissional de alta 
qualidade 
     
Falta de acesso ao governo/estado, instituições 
de fomento, e a grandes empresas (networking) 




V – Apoio técnico e administrativo 
27. Indique o nível da qualidade dos serviços oferecido pela incubadora ou pela instituição que ela 
pertence: 
Em uma escala de 0 (Não existe) 




0 1 2 3 4 5 
Identificação e ligação de parceiros fora do 
estado 
       
Apoio à constituição legal de empresas        
Apoios financeiros à criação de empresas        
Identificação e ligação a potenciais clientes        
Canal para a criação de relacionamentos com 
parceiros estratégicos 
       
Consultoria Estratégica        
Apoio ao Marketing        
Realização de Estudos de mercado        
Consultoria Estratégica        
Assistência no registro de propriedade 
intelectual 
       
Apoio na elaboração do Plano de Negócios        
Organização de Workshops/Seminários        
Formação Profissional        
Apoio à Contabilidade        
Infra-estrutura laboratorial para pesquisa 
aplicada (mesmo fornecida fora da incubadora) 
       





29. Indique o nível de intervenção da incubadora na gestão da empresa em acordo com esses valores: 
1 - Intervenção leve - A incubadora presta serviço de consultoria e apoio às funções de gestão só quando a 
empresa mostra  iniciativa e  necessidade. (iniciativa do empreendedor) 
3 – Intervenção moderada - A incubadora acompanha as ações da empresa, implicando um sistema de 
controle de metas periodicamente. (iniciativa conjunta) 
5 – Intervenção intensa - A incubadora atua com uma intervenção constante e intensiva na gestão da 
empresa com um sistema rigoroso de controle de metas. (iniciativa da incubadora) 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
 
VI – Networking 
30. De que formas a empresa (através de seus funcionários da empresa) interage com outras empresas 
incubadas (com os funcionários de outras empresas)? 
Tempo livre no local da incubadora  Parcerias, projetos em conjunto  
Intranet  Palestras  
Reuniões  Seminários  
Eventos de socialização - “café tecnológico”  Adquirindo serviços de outra empresa  
Eventos de premiação (ex. melhor empresa)  Outras:_______________________________  
 
31. Interacção com outras empresas: A empresa obtém contatos com: (Pode marcar varias opções) 
Quase não obtém contatos com outras 
empresas incubadas 
 Empresas da mesma incubadora  
Empresas em outras incubadoras do estado  Empresas incubadas de outros estados  
  
32. Qual é a motivação da empresa e de seus funcionários de interagir com outras empresas 
incubadas? 
Em uma escala de 1 (Pouco relevante) 
a 5 (Muito relevante) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Parcerias já existentes com outras empresas      
Possibilidade de formar futuras parcerias      
Trocar conhecimento e experiências técnicas      
Trocar conhecimento de mercado      
Trocar conhecimento de gestão        
Acesso à variedade de recursos humanos      
Manter boas relações de vizinhança      
33. Em que nível a incubadora estimula interação entre as empresas incubadas? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Em uma escala de 1 (não estimula) 
a 5 (estimula muito) 
     
 
 
